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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of BENJAMIN GLADDEN 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
ROBERT DENNISON, Chair, 
New York State Division of Parole, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-07-ST7751 Index No. 3355-07 
Appearances : Benjamin Gladden 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Lyon Mountain Correctional Facility 
3864 Route 374 
Lyon Mountain, New York 12952 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224-034 1 
(Kelly L. Munkwitz, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner. an inmate at Lyon Mountain Correctional Facility, has cammencedthe 
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instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on 
January 16,2006 denying petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving 
a term of seven years to life for the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon, 3rd Degree, 
which occurred while the petitioner was on parole. Due to his extensive criminal history, the 
petitioner was sentenced as a persistent and violent felony offender. Among the many 
arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board’s determination 
was arbitrary and capricious and violated his rights to due process. Petitioner alleges that 
the Parol Board placed too much emphasis on the serious nature of his crime and his criminal 
history and not enough on his institutional achievements, which included the completion of 
Phase 111, and ASAT as well as his receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate. In doing so 
petitioner alleges that the respondent violated 0 2594 of the Executive Law. Petitioner also 
claims that the guideline ranges were not properly considered by the parole board and finally, 
that its decision was too vague and conclusory to provide him with an adequate explanation 
of why parole was denied. 
Addressing a threshold issue, the petitioner, in an affidavit denominated “Motion to 
Dismiss Pursuant to CPLR 9 321 l(c),” maintains that respondent’s answer was untimely 
served. The Court, however, by letter dated August 29,2007, granted the respondent a one 
week extension to serve his answer, to and including September 7, 2007. Respondent’s 
papers were timely served on August 30,2007. In view of the foregoing and for the reasons 
set forth herein below, the Court finds that the petitioner’s motion must be denied. 
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With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 0 2594, since it does not create 
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd 
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2nd Cir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock ( 5  16 
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY, 
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
The arbitrary and capricious argument that petitioner raises requires a little more 
analysis. It is well established that “[plarole release decisions are discretionary and, if made 
pursuant to statutory requirements, not reviewable” (hlatlcr uf Siiiuguli 1, fi L‘N Y d i  Stillc 
Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 AD2d 944). If the parole board‘s decision is made in accordance 
with the statutory requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review 
(see Ristau v. Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing 
of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to 
necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], 
quoting Matter d Kusso v. New k’ork State Bd. d P’aruk, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the 
absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination 
made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
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The statutory requirements are set forth in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A) which 
states that: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (I) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview as well as the Parole Board’s decision reveals that, in addition to the instant 
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his 
receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon 
release. The petitioner’s allegations that too much attention was paid to his criminal history 
and the serious nature of his crime are without merit. It is proper, and in fact required, that 
4 
[* 4 ]
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see 
Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; 
Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of 
Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history 
(see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 
254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). Additionally, it is well settled that receipt of a certificate 
of earned eligibility does not serve as a guarantee of release (see, People ex rel. Justice v 
Russi, 226 AD2d 821 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Flecha v Russi, 221 AD2d 780 [3d Dept., 
19851; Matter of Walker v Russi, 176 AD2d 1185 [3d Dept., 19911 lv dismissed 79 NY2d 
897). 
With regard to the allegation that the Parole Board’s decision was too vague, the 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see 
Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 
653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter oi’Collado L N w  YurA S~aic Divisiuii d’PawJc, 287 AD2d 
92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 13). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set 
forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v 
Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). 
All that is required of the board is that it make its determination within the parameters 
of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A). “Where appropriate the Board may give considerable 
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weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
Here, the record reflects that the board considered the relevant factors when reaching 
their decision on whether to grant petitioner parole. The reasons for the respondent’s 
determination to deny petitioner release on parole are set forth as follows: 
“Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next appearance 1/2008. 
Notwithstanding the Earned Eligibility Certificate, after a 
review of the record and interview, the Panel has determined 
that if released at this time, there is a reasonable probability that 
you would not live and remain at liberty without again violating 
the law and your release at this time is incompatible with the 
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of 
the crime as to undermine respect for the law. The decision is 
based on the following factors: Your instant offense, Criminal 
Possession of a Weapon 3rd Degree represents a continuation of 
your criminal history that includes prior convictions for 
Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3rd Degree and 
Attempted Robbery. You were on parole supervision for 
Attempted Robbery in the lst Degree when you committed the 
instant offense. This Panel notes your positive programmatic 
participation since your last Parole Board appearance, including 
completion of Phase I11 and ASAT. You have also incurred 
approximately two Tier I1 misbehavior reports since your last 
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Parole Board appearance. He's above the guidelines due to 
sentence structure. Continuous involvement with the criminal 
justice system. Negative response to past correctional influence. 
All commissioners concur." 
This decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parole and, as such it, satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see 
Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New 
Ymk State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). 
Finally, with respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the 
guideline range (see, 9 NYCRR 800 1.3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and 
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual 
case'' (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 
290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a 
basis to overturn the Board's decision. 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED that petitioner's motion pursuant to CPLR 321 1 (c) be and hereby is 
denied; and it is 
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ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
‘I’his shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
DecisiodOrder/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. I 
ENTER 
Dated: October 38, 2007 
Troy, New York erne Court Justice 
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